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Public-private sector interactions and the demand for supplementary health 
insurance in the United Kingdom 
 
ABSTRACT 
We examine the demand for private health insurance (PHI) in the United Kingdom and 
relate this to changes in the supply of public and private healthcare. Using a novel collection 
of administrative, private sector and survey data, we re-assess the relationships between 
the quality and availability of public and private sector inpatient care, and the demand for 
PHI. We find that PHI coverage in the United Kingdom is positively related to the median of 
the region- and year-specific public sector waiting times. We find that PHI prevalence ceteris 
paribus increases with being self-employed and employed, while it decreases with having 
financial difficulties. In addition, we highlight the complexities of inter-sectoral relations and 
their impact on PHI demand. Within a region, we find that an increase in private healthcare 
supply is associated with a decrease in public sector waiting times, implying lower PHI 
demand. This may be explained by the usage of private facilities by NHS commissioners. 
These results have important implications for policymakers interested in the role of private 
healthcare supply in enhancing the availability of and equitable access to acute inpatient 
care. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the determinants of demand for private health insurance (PHI) in the 
United Kingdom - a context in which the National Health Service (NHS) provides a 
comprehensive statutory package of services free-at-the-point-of-use, and in which 
supplementary coverage is held by approximately 15% of the population aged over 20. This 
coverage offers insurance against the costs of privately-delivered services that are also 
provided within the NHS (for which PHI subscribers must continue to pay through their 
taxes and to which they retain full access). The key attractions of holding such coverage are 
therefore the access to faster treatment and wider choice of specialists, facilities and timing 
of treatment that it may provide (Rodríguez and Stoyanova, 2004). However, premiums for 
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individual purchasers tend to be expensive, and only a minority of employers offer coverage 
to their staff (Foubister et al., 2006). Accordingly, baseline models view the perceived 
quality of public sector provision, together with income, as the main determinants of the 
demand for PHI (e.g. Besley et al., 1999; Costa and García, 2003).   
To date, conflicting results have been observed with respect to the association 
between PHI demand and the quality of NHS services, as measured by waiting times.1 Besley 
et al. (1999) find that regions of England characterised by longer waiting lists have higher 
PHI coverage on average. King and Mossialos (2005) also find significant associations 
between waiting times and PHI coverage. In contrast, Propper et al. (2001) find that, in 
England, waiting lists do not play a role in explaining PHI coverage. Instead, the number of 
private hospitals and senior doctors are important, along with age. The authors suggest that 
as the stock of medical labour is fixed in the short run higher private sector capacity reduces 
the supply of senior doctors available to the NHS, giving rise to a perception among patients 
that the quality and capacity of the private sector has increased relative to those of the NHS. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that perceived differences in quality and capacity between 
the public and private sectors have a major influence on PHI demand. 
However, the latter study draws attention to the complex nature of public-private 
sector interaction in terms of the effect on demand for PHI. In this respect, it is significant 
that the extent of such interaction has increased since these earlier studies were conducted. 
This is especially the case in England where market-oriented structural reforms aimed at 
providing patients with more choice have been an important part of the policy framework. 
Since 2002, many NHS patients (in England and to a lesser extent in Scotland and Wales) 
                                                            
1 As clinical outcomes data are rudimentary in the NHS, consumer perceptions of quality are likely to focus on 
intermediate aspects, especially waiting times. 
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have been treated at private hospitals for diagnostic and elective services. From January 
2006, General Practitioners were required to offer patients a choice of four or five hospitals 
(Naylor and Gregory, 2009). In addition, reforms introduced between 2003 and 2008 
formalised and greatly increased the ability of private hospitals to compete with NHS 
hospitals for patients, for instance through the so-called Independent Sector Treatment 
Centre programme, which delivered a wide range of routine elective care for NHS-funded 
patients (Kelly and Stoye, 2015). In consequence, spending on private facilities by NHS 
commissioners in England (mostly Primary Care Trusts and, from 2011, some Clinical 
Commissioning Groups) more than quadrupled in real terms between 2002 and 2012, to 
£1.2 billion (Competition & Markets Authority, 2014). By the end of that period funding 
from NHS commissioners constituted 28% of inpatient income for private hospitals (Laing & 
Buisson, 2013). 
In this context, the relationships between the supply of private healthcare and the 
demand for PHI has become more complex than was the case when the aforementioned 
studies were undertaken. For instance, higher private sector capacity might increase the 
demand for PHI if inpatient care providers are able to “induce” demand for their services 
and consumers seek financial protection against the associated costs (Labelle et al., 1994). 
In this case, the positive effect of higher private sector supply on PHI demand may offset the 
negative effect of lower NHS waiting times on PHI demand. Conversely, if private hospital 
capacity is made available to NHS patients, and this leads to a reduction in NHS waiting 
times, this may contribute to a reduction in PHI demand.  
Our aim, therefore, is to examine the PHI demand and the relationships with the 
quality and availability of public and private sector inpatient care. To address this aim, we 
use a novel combination of survey data from 2000-2011 matched with administrative and 
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private sector data. In addition, we use new waiting time measure. According to Foubister 
et al. (2006), PHI packages typically cover surgery as an inpatient or day case, hospital 
accommodation and nursing care, and inpatient tests. We therefore use a measure of NHS 
waiting time that is likely to be most relevant to the choice between publicly and privately 
financed healthcare – the median inpatient waiting time. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we outline our data 
sources and descriptive statistics. In section 3, we present our empirical results. In section 4, 
we relate our findings to previous theoretical and empirical literature and end with an 
outline of policy implications.  
 
2. DATA AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
We make use of data from two surveys covering the period 2000-2011: the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). Both 
the BHPS and ELSA data were accessed through the UK Data Archive (UKDA). The BHPS ran 
annually between 1990 and 2008 but the questions regarding PHI coverage were only asked 
from wave 6 (1996). After 2008 the Understanding Society survey replaced the BHPS, but 
does not provide information on PHI coverage. In our analysis of the BHPS we excluded 
respondents aged below 20 years and those living in Northern Ireland. We focus on the 
years 2000-2008 as some of the regional level indicators are not available for earlier years.  
ELSA is a bi-annual survey covering people aged 50 and above, restricted to England only. 
The first wave of the survey was conducted in 2002/2003, and we use data up to years 
2010/2011 (wave 5). Using two different surveys (BHPS and ELSA) allows us to check the 
robustness of the results with respect to the source of individual data, finding that the 
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results are qualitatively robust. In addition, the ELSA data make it possible to extend the 
analysis period up to 2011. 
We focus on a single indicator of PHI coverage: whether the respondent is covered 
by any type of PHI, regardless of whether this coverage is provided by an employer or 
through the purchase of another family member. The prevalence of PHI coverage among 
the population aged over 20 was 15.4% in 2008, the final year of the BHPS. Of this, around 
one third paid all or a part of the premium directly; one third received the insurance via 
their employer; and the final third were insured through the purchase of another family 
member.  
Table 1 shows the time pattern of PHI coverage rates in the UK. The coverage rates 
fell at the end of the 1990s, when tax relief on PHI premiums was discontinued, and again in 
2007, which we assume is due to the financial crisis which began in that year. The degree of 
stability in the PHI rates is notable, given that this was a period in which NHS funding 
increased at its fastest ever rate, at an average of 6.6% per year between 2000 and 2008 
(Appleby et al., 2008), which might have been expected to exert greater influence on PHI 
coverage rates. This may imply that the high transaction costs associated with buying and 
selling PHI, alongside a certain degree of consumer inertia, were features of this market in 
this period. In addition, , as we discuss below, factors such as lower waiting times and the 
higher supply of private care may have offsetting effects. 
According to the BHPS data, PHI coverage is most prevalent among people aged30-
60, and the coverage rate peaks around age 40. The difference between the BHPS and ELSA 
statistics, which can also be seen in Table 1, are explained by the different age coverage. 
Coverage rates are higher in England than in Scotland and Wales, and there is considerable 
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regional variation in PHI prevalence also within England. The highest prevalence is observed 
in London, the East of England and the South East. 
 
***[insert Table 1 here]*** 
 
We merge both data sets with region-level indicators of public and private 
healthcare supply: specifically, real public sector health expenditures per capita, available 
public hospital beds per capita, and private hospital beds per capita. Further indicators (as 
specification checks) are introduced in section 3.3. The regions are the former Government 
Office Regions of England, while Scotland and Wales are considered as individual regions (as 
listed in Table 1). We use various public data sources to construct the indicators of public 
inpatient healthcare availability.  We do not use indicators of the availability of outpatient 
care. Since PHI typically covers inpatient care only, it is unlikely that outpatient care 
availability would exert a strong influence on PHI demand. Detailed descriptions of the data 
sources and the construction of the variables are provided in Appendix A. Region-specific 
statistics at the beginning and end of the study period are provided in Appendix B.  
The inpatient waiting times data are based on the Hospital Episode Statistics as 
provided by the Health & Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC), the Information Services 
Division (ISD) Scotland, and the Patient Episode Database for Wales (PEDW). Unlike Besley 
et al. (1999), Propper et al. (2001), and Jofre-Bonet (2000) (using Spanish data), in which the 
length of waiting lists are used as a proxy for waiting times, we collected data on median 
waiting times. This indicator captures more effectively the time that patients can expect to 
wait for inpatient treatment, which is more likely to influence PHI demand than the length 
of waiting lists itself (as also pointed out by Johar et al. (2013)). 
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In the first part of the period the median inpatient waiting times increased (by up to 
approximately seven weeks in England) but then fell from 2005 onwards (down to around 
five weeks in England). Differences in statistical methodologies across regions and over time 
imply measurement errors, decreasing the statistical significance of the empirical results. 
The BHPS results are robust to restricting the estimation sample to England only, thus 
avoiding the measurement differences with Scotland and Wales. 
The private healthcare data are from Laing and Buisson’s Healthcare Market Review, 
volumes 1999/2000 through to 2009/2010. Laing and Buisson is an independent specialist 
consultancy in health and community care, and has reviewed the UK private healthcare 
market since 1988.  The time pattern of private and public inpatient beds per capita is 
starkly different in two ways. First, the average number of available private beds is an order 
of magnitude smaller than of the public beds (three NHS hospital beds and 0.35 private 
inpatient beds per 1000 inhabitants in England in 2010/2011). Second, the trend of available 
private beds is increasing, while the number of public beds has diminished. This contrast is 
particularly notable in Wales, which has seen both the strongest increase in private beds 
and the strongest decrease in public beds. 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In section 3.1, we analyse how PHI is related to the quality and availability of public 
healthcare services and the availability of private healthcare services. In section 3.2, we 
document the interrelations between the supply of private inpatient care services, and the 
quality and availability of public inpatient care services. In section 3.3, we extend the 
analysis of PHI coverage with indicators of NHS spending on private care and private care 
quality. We summarise the results in section 3.4. 
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3.1 Identifying the determinants of PHI coverage 
First, we estimate probit models of PHI coverage to reveal the correlations with health care 
indicators. The estimated model is: 
Pr(𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 1) = 𝛷(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑟𝑡).    (1) 
Subscript i refers to individual, r to region, and t to time. The model is estimated separately 
on the BHPS and the ELSA data. All survey years are pooled together, but in this baseline 
specification we do not include time effects and individual or region fixed effects. The time 
coverage of the regressions runs from 2000/2001 to 2008/2009 in case of the BHPS data and 
from 2002/2003 to 2010/2011 in the case of the ELSA data. 𝑍 is the vector of public and 
private healthcare indicators, vector 𝑋 includes gender, age, age squared, marital status, 
having children, education level, health, financial circumstances, employment, smoking 
habits, and political preferences. While specification (1) suffers from omitted-variables bias 
due to unobserved regional and individual characteristics, this model allows us to reliably 
estimate coefficients for regressors with limited time variation. 
 Next, we extend the model with year effects and individual fixed effects (FE) and 
estimate a linear probability FE model. We apply this linear specification to avoid the problem 
of incidental parameters inherent in probit FE models:  
𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1?̃?𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑍𝑟𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑡.  (2) 
In the above, ?̃?  is the same as 𝑋 in equation (1), but excludes age and individual 
characteristics with little or no time variation (gender, having children, education level). The 
individual fixed effects (𝜃) capture unobserved, time-invariant, individual-specific PHI 
demand characteristics. Region dummies are not included due to the negligible within-
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individual variation. The time effects (𝜋) capture aggregate economic or political changes 
that can influence PHI demand.  
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 we present the estimates based on the BHPS data, 
and in columns (3) and (4) we present the results based on the ELSA data. Subjective health 
is excluded from the set of regressors when using the ELSA data, because it is unavailable 
for wave 3. Also, we do not include indicators of political preferences because of the lack of 
variables comparable to the BHPS indicators. 
  
***[insert Table 2 about here]*** 
 
Estimating equation (1) shows a positive correlation of PHI coverage with NHS waiting times, 
and a negative correlation with public healthcare expenditures. These relations are 
statistically significant and of the expected sign, as higher quality and availability of public 
healthcare decreases the demand for  care that is not funded by the NHS, and hence also for 
PHI. The positive relation to waiting times is stronger in the ELSA data, which is based on 
later years and an older population. In addition, PHI coverage is more likely to be purchased 
if there is a greater supply of private care in the region. The relation to the relative number 
of public hospital beds is insignificant. 
Further analysis of the results of columns (1) and (3) reveals that PHI coverage is 
more prevalent among the self-employed or employed. Having financial difficulties implies 
seven percentage points lower likelihood of PHI coverage, and reporting good or excellent 
health implies two percentage points higher likelihood of coverage. The results are robust to 
the choice between the datasets used. 
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Apart from waiting times, the healthcare indicators do not have a statistically 
significant relation to PHI coverage once time and individual effects are accounted for. This 
change in the coefficients suggests that there are important time-constant, region- and 
individual-specific differences in healthcare provision and PHI coverage rates. The low 
within-individual 𝑅-squared values also indicate limited temporal variation in the variables. 
The estimated coefficient of private inpatient care supply has an unexpected 
negative sign when equation (2) is estimated using the BHPS data, implying that an increase 
in private supply within a region is on average negatively related to PHI coverage.  
One possible explanation is that the increasing degree of competition among private 
providers (that is implied by greater capacity) drives down the costs of service provision, 
thereby lowering the demand for PHI. However, in the context of a recent inquiry by the UK 
Competition and Markets Authority (2014), which found high barriers to entry and 
expansion for private hospitals and weak competition among private hospitals in many 
markets, this explanation is unpersuasive. A more likely explanation is that a higher number 
of private beds enables greater usage of private hospitals by the NHS in order to reduce 
waiting times, thereby reducing PHI demand. This explanation is further supported by the 
results on private beds and waiting times reported in section 3.2 below. 
The results also indicate that, over the analysed years, there was very little variation 
in PHI coverage within each region, and hence little change to be explained by region-
specific variation in the indicators of public and private care. The significant relations 
between PHI coverage and public and private healthcare indicators stem from aggregate, 
not region-specific, changes in supply and from time-invariant differences in PHI demand 
and the supply of healthcare across regions.  
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The results of equation (2) also indicate that the demand for PHI increases if 
someone becomes employed or self-employed, but decreases with entering into financial 
difficulties or reporting improving health. 
Estimating the models of PHI coverage reveals policy-relevant relations between the 
public and private healthcare sectors. The possibility of reverse causality is reduced by 
relatively low PHI coverage rates and the small scale of the private healthcare sector in the 
UK. Inevitably, therefore, the influence of PHI coverage on the healthcare supply statistics is 
weak. In addition, the results are robust to using the lagged values of the healthcare 
indicators. Nevertheless, if PHI coverage increases the demand for private healthcare and 
decreases the demand for public healthcare, this implies a certain degree of upward bias in 
the coefficient of private hospital beds, and downward bias in the coefficients of public 
expenditures, public hospital beds and waiting times in the models of PHI coverage. 
 
3.2 Availability of private inpatient care and the availability and quality of NHS inpatient care 
Our unique dataset on the supply of private hospital beds makes it possible to analyse how 
the availability of private inpatient care is related to the availability and quality of public 
sector care, and thereby examine further the ambiguous relations between private hospital 
bed supply and PHI coverage outlined in section 3.1. We document pairwise relations 
between the indicator of private inpatient care availability and indicators of public health 
care. We do not estimate causal effects. 
We run the following region-level panel regressions with region fixed effects, 
covering years 2000/2001 to 2008/2009 (corresponding to the time coverage of the BHPS 
data used): 
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𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑠𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑡 + Ψ𝑟 + 𝜀𝑟𝑡 , (3) 
 
where index 𝑟 indicates region and index 𝑡 time. We run three separate regressions: first, 
waiting times; second, public hospital beds; third, public health expenditures included as 
regressor. This is essentially a correlation analysis among the variables cleaned from the 
region-specific, time-invariant characteristics. The estimated 𝛼1 coefficients are presented 
in Table 3. Including both time and region fixed effects simultaneously leads to insignificant 
results, which implies that part of the estimated effects are due to aggregate rather than 
region-specific shocks. 
 
***[insert Table 3 about here]*** 
 
The results indicate that on average within a region, one week shorter inpatient waiting 
times are associated with 14 more private hospital beds per 1 million population. This 
suggests that over time within a region shorter waiting times are achieved partly by a higher 
supply of private care beds (e.g. in the East of England and East Midlands regions).  
The numbers of public and private hospital beds are negatively related within a 
region, over time, again suggesting substitutions between public and private care 
availability. The correlations with public health expenditures only correspond to the 
observation that during the analysed period on average within a region both the public 
expenditures and the number of private beds increased, partly due to the increased use of 
private sector facilities by the NHS. 
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3.3 Extensions with further indicators of private care 
In section 3.1. above, we showed that across regions, the number of private inpatient beds 
is positively related to PHI demand. To analyse how the use of private beds by the NHS and 
the quality of private inpatient care influence this relationship, we re-estimate equation (1) 
with additional indicators. As we have observations for a few waves only, we cannot reliably 
re-estimate equation (2), and do not include these indicators as part of the main 
specifications. For the purpose of simplifying the discussion, we estimate these models on 
the BHPS data, only. The detailed results are reported in Appendix C. 
 First, we extend the model with an indicator of NHS spending on private healthcare: 
the proportion of commissioners’ secondary care budgets spent on services from private 
hospitals. The source for these data is the Nuffield Trust, as detailed in Appendix A. These 
data are available for England only, in the years from 2006. This indicator is negatively 
correlated with public hospital beds and waiting times, and positively correlated with 
private hospital beds. However, using this indicator, we do not find evidence that the 
extended use of private sector providers by the NHS reduces the demand for PHI. The 
marginal effect of the indicator of NHS expenditure on private sector care is positive but 
insignificant. The positive estimated effect of waiting times increases, but becomes 
insignificant with the limited time coverage.   
 Next, as a proxy for the quality of private inpatient care, we use the regional level 
median prices of two treatment types: hip replacement (median price: £11,054) and 
cataract surgery (median price: £2,420). These indicators are based on the prices quoted in 
“privatehealth.co.uk” website (Appendix A provides further details). The rationale for using 
price as a proxy for quality is based on Bagwell and Riordan (1991) and Wolinsky (1983), 
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who show that high prices are an efficient means of signalling quality where information is 
asymmetric between producers and consumers (which is likely to be the case for inpatient 
care). As historical data are unavailable, we have to make the assumption that regional 
differences in private care quality are permanent.  
Re-estimating equation (1) on the cross-section of year 2008 and adding in the price 
indicators increases the positive estimated effect of waiting times by one order of 
magnitude. The estimated effect of hip replacement price is significantly positive, while the 
effect of cataract surgery price is negative but insignificant. The estimated effect of private 
bed availability on PHI demand becomes insignificant, which is due to the strong positive 
correlation (0.83) between the indicators of private bed availability and the median cost of 
hip replacement. Overall, given data limitations and the possible endogeneity of prices, 
these results provide weak evidence that the demand for PHI increases with the regional 
level quality of private inpatient care. 
3.4 Summary of results 
In relation to the first part of the analysis (section 3.1), we conclude that longer waiting 
times are associated with higher PHI prevalence. Specifically, an increase in median 
inpatient waiting times of 10 weeks is associated with a 2-8 percentage points higher rate of 
PHI coverage. This positive relationship can be seen if we analyse PHI coverage differences 
both within regions through time and across regions. In terms of the latter, there is a 
positive association between higher PHI coverage and the supply of private healthcare. 
Increasing the number of private inpatient beds by one per 1000 inhabitants is associated 
with approximately 23-29 percentage points higher PHI prevalence. Across regions, we find 
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positive relationships between private sector capacity, PHI coverage and waiting times. The 
availability of NHS hospital beds has a weaker relation to PHI coverage probability.  
Table 4 provides a brief summary of how these results relate to the earlier evidence 
in the literature. 
 
***[insert Table 4 about here]*** 
 
There are some persistent differences across regions. These differences partly stem 
from region-specific preferences for private healthcare. For example, the East of England 
and London are among the regions with the highest PHI coverage rates. At the same time, 
these areas are characterised by long waiting times (East of England) and/or high numbers 
of private inpatient beds (London). These differences persist across the 11-year study 
period, such that when region effects (via individual fixed effects) are included, there are 
insignificant relations between PHI coverage and the indicators of healthcare supply.  
Changes in the healthcare indicators are often due to aggregate shocks such as 
country-level changes in NHS expenditures and policies. If the level of PHI demand reacts to 
aggregate changes, e.g. to a decrease in waiting times throughout England, Scotland and 
Wales, then time effects capture these reactions and again lead to insignificant results.  
In relation to the second part of the analysis (section 3.2), the results indicate that 
higher private healthcare supply within a region is associated with lower waiting times. 
Specifically, on average within a region, one week shorter inpatient waiting times are 
associated with 14 more private hospital beds per 1 million inhabitants. This may suggest 
that over time within a region shorter waiting times are partly achieved by the higher supply 
of private healthcare which in turn reduces PHI demand. This is in line with Arora et al. 
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(2013), who provide indicative evidence for substitutions between publicly and privately 
funded inpatient care. 
Extending the analysis with additional indicators of private care availability and 
quality in section 3.3 indicates that across regions, the positive relation between waiting 
times and PHI demand is a qualitatively robust result, and private care quality might induce 
PHI demand, though the evidence is weak. 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper examines interactions between the public and private sectors in healthcare 
provision and the demand for PHI in the United Kingdom. Using commercial, administrative 
and survey data, we find that PHI coverage is positively related to NHS waiting times, 
employment, and financial status. The results on waiting times correspond to the 
predictions of the models presented by Besley et al. (1999) and Costa and García (2003) 
among others. They are consistent with the findings of previous empirical studies (Besley et 
al. 1999; King and Mossialos, 2005), but contrary to those of Propper et al. (2001).  The 
results are based on region and time specific median inpatient waiting times, which capture 
more effectively the time that patients can expect to wait for hospital admission than mean 
waiting times, or the length of the waiting lists.  
The period we examine is one in which the role of the private sector in the delivery 
of publicly funded health services has increased  against a backdrop of rising real 
expenditures, decreasing numbers of NHS inpatient beds, increasing numbers of private 
sector inpatient beds, and falling NHS waiting times. Our findings highlight the complexity of 
intersectoral interactions in this context. Within a region over time an increase in private 
inpatient healthcare supply is associated with a decrease in waiting times and PHI 
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prevalence. This may be explained by the purchase of private care by NHS commissioners, 
reducing waiting times and the propensity of consumers to buy PHI. This suggests that 
greater use of private sector by the NHS can help to cut waiting times and reduce PHI 
demand. This interpretation is supported by Kelly and Stoye (2015), who show that the 
introduction of privately owned hospitals in geographic areas increased overall demand for 
elective hip replacements but also reduced waiting times for these services in those areas.   
However, it is worth noting that large-scale use of private sector capacity in recent 
years has been enabled by historic increases in public expenditure on healthcare which are 
unlikely to re-occur in the coming years (NHS England, 2013). Our results have implications 
for policymakers that operate in a context of tight budgetary control. The current NHS 
England planning framework, for example, assumes that NHS expenditure will grow at 
approximately the rate of inflation between 2010/11 and 2020/21, with the result that 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP will decrease from 7.7% to 6% (NHS England, 2013). 
These projections are likely to imply stricter control, and perhaps more rationing, of publicly 
funded health services. In this respect, the positive relationship between the availability of 
private inpatient healthcare, waiting times and PHI coverage across regions is likely to be of 
interest to policy-makers. The results imply that higher waiting times result in higher 
demand for private inpatient care, and financial protection against the associated costs.  
In this context, our results suggest that the demand for PHI may increase in the 
coming years as publicly financed care (undertaken in both the public and the private 
sector) is constrained. In addition, we have shown that the prevalence of PHI coverage 
increases with being self-employed and employed and with deteriorating health, and 
decreases with having financial difficulties. It is possible that a change in the propensity to 
use privately-financed healthcare, especially among the relatively affluent, may in the 
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coming years erode support for the NHS and/or enhance the political acceptability of 
alternatives which, in turn, may lead to greater inequity in coverage and access to 
healthcare.   
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Private health insurance coverage by year and by region 
 BHPS data  
 
BHPS, average over 
1996-2008 
ELSA, average 
over 2002-2011 
1996 17.8% 
 North East 12.04% 6.21% 
1997 16.9% 
 North West 16.33% 12.79% 
1998 17.5% 
 Yorkshire & Humber 18.34% 11.41% 
1999 15.1% 
 East Midlands 14.52% 13.38% 
2000 15.4% 
 West Midlands 16.72% 11.90% 
2001 15.5% 
 East of England 22.31% 17.67% 
2002 16.6% 
 London 24.95% 21.95% 
2003 16.6% 
 South East 23.49% 20.32% 
2004 16.1% 
 South West 16.42% 14.51% 
2005 16.2% 
 Wales 12.60%  
2006 16.5% 
 Scotland 10.52%  
2007 15.8% 
    
2008 15.4% 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Table 2: Average marginal effects on PHI coverage probability (columns 1 and 3) and FE estimates 
(columns 2 and 4) 
 BHPS data ELSA data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
median waiting times (week) 0.00337** 0.00239* 0.00762*** 0.00746*** 
  [0.00138] [0.00145] [0.00171] [0.00272] 
public hospital beds  0.00215 -0.0146 -0.00525 -0.0163 
(per 1000 population) [0.00454] [0.00989] [0.00449] [0.0120] 
private hospital beds  0.233*** -0.0229 0.290*** 0.0133 
(per 1000 population) [0.0218] [0.0369] [0.0274] [0.0426] 
public HC expenditures (per -0.0379*** 0.00818 -0.0399*** 0.0116 
capita, 1000 GBP, 2005 prices) [0.00728] [0.0314] [0.0129] [0.0433] 
financial difficulties -0.0713*** -0.00745*** -0.0691*** -0.00148 
 [0.00449] [0.00239] [0.00700] [0.00620] 
employed or self-employed 0.0688*** 0.0333*** 0.0116* 0.0540*** 
 [0.00668] [0.00447] [0.00692] [0.00701] 
retired -0.00428 -0.0132** 0.00762*** -0.00388 
 [0.0101] [0.00526] [0.00171] [0.00446] 
good health 0.0187*** -0.00397*   
 [0.00441] [0.00235]   
wave dummies no yes no yes 
individual fixed effects no yes no yes 
individual control variables yes yes yes yes 
Observations 95,199 95,744 50,724 50,941 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1071  0.0852  
Within individual R-squared  0.0047  0.0142 
Between individual R-squared  0.0201  0.0106 
Robust standard errors in brackets (Probit: clustered at individual level), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Individual controls include age squared, marital status, smoking and political preferences (BHPS 
only). Additional controls in specifications (1) and (3): gender, age, secondary and higher education 
dummy, having children. 
 
Table 3: Estimated coefficients of the indicators of public care, dependent variable: number of 
private hospital beds per million population (data coverage: England, Scotland, Wales, 2000/2001 
to 2008/2009) 
Regressor 
Median inpatient 
waiting times (week) 
Public hospital beds 
per 1,000 population 
Per capita public health expenditures, 
1,000 GBP, 2005 prices 
-14.390*** -78.237*** 96.847*** 
[4.236] [13.594] [15.658] 
Robust standard errors in brackets, ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Region fixed effects 
included. Each column corresponds to a separate regression. 
 
  
Table 4: Overview of the earlier and current results 
 
Besley et al. (1999) Propper et al. (2001) 
King & Mossialos 
(2005) 
Our results 
Ti
m
e 
co
ve
ra
ge
 
1986-1991 1978-1996 1997-2000 2000-2011 
M
et
h
o
d
 Probit with time 
and region effects 
Linear FE models with 
time and region effects 
Random effects 
logit  
Probit and linear FE 
models with and 
without time and 
individual effects 
M
ai
n
 r
es
u
lt
s 
o
n
 P
H
I c
o
ve
ra
ge
 
Long term (>12 
months) waiting 
lists have 
significant positive 
effect 
Insignificant waiting 
lists, negative effect 
of NHS expenditures, 
positive effect of 
private care 
availability 
Significant positive 
effects of inpatient 
and outpatient 
waiting times and 
of the supply of 
private surgeons 
Negative relation to 
NHS expenditures and 
public beds, positive 
relation to private 
beds and waiting 
times. Apart from the 
relation to waiting 
times, the relations 
become insignificant if 
individual and time 
effects are included. 
 
